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Mark C. Freeman6, Ben Groom7,* & Thomas Sterner8  3 
 4 
Abstract 5 
Under the UN Paris Agreement, countries committed to limiting global warming to well 6 
below 2°C, and to actively pursue a 1.5°C limit. Yet, according to the 2018 Economics Nobel 7 
laureate William Nordhaus, these targets are economically suboptimal or unattainable and 8 
the world community should aim for 3.5°C in 2100 instead. Here we show that the UN 9 
climate targets may be optimal even in the DICE integrated assessment model, when 10 
appropriately updated. Changes to DICE include more accurate calibration of the carbon 11 
cycle and energy balance model, and updated climate damage estimates. To determine 12 
economically “optimal” climate policy paths, we use evidence on the range of expert views 13 
on the ethics of intergenerational welfare. When updates from climate science and 14 
economics are considered jointly, we find that around three-quarters (one-third) of expert 15 
views on intergenerational welfare translate into economically optimal climate policy paths 16 
that are consistent with the 2°C (1.5°C) target. 17 
 18 
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 2
Limiting global warming to well below 2°C (let alone 1.5°C) as decided in the UNFCCC Paris 20 
Climate Agreement is either unattainable or far from the economic optimal according to 21 
William Nordhaus
1
. Instead, his economic analysis implies a climate policy path that limits 22 
global warming to 3.5°C by the end of the century and decarbonizes the economy only in 23 
the next century. According to Nordhaus, this reflects the economically optimal balance 24 
between future benefits and current costs. So while both the UN climate targets and Nobel 25 
Prize winner highlight the need for a policy response to global climate change, they are 26 
strikingly different in the stringency of the recommended temperature goals and the 27 
implied emission pathways over the century
2,3
. 28 
Nordhaus’ recommendations are derived from the DICE integrated assessment model (IAM), 29 
which he created and developed in several steps
4,5
. The model seeks to find the optimal 30 
emission, temperature and carbon tax trajectories by balancing the costs of emissions 31 
reductions and the damages of climate change, measured in economic terms. Emissions 32 
reductions are justified provided the benefits of avoiding climate damages outweigh the 33 
costs, e.g. higher costs associated with energy supply. Nordhaus was early in making his 34 
model readily available to the research community and it has become central in climate 35 
economic analysis and highly influential in policy discussions6-8. However, DICE has also been 36 
criticized on a number of grounds. These include the choice of discounting parameters
9-11
, 37 
the model’s omission of uncertainty and the risk for climate catastrophes
12-15
, the treatment 38 
of non-market damages16,17, and details of its climate model18-20. Notably DICE’s concept of 39 
economic optimality, i.e. maximizing a Discounted Utilitarian social welfare function, has 40 
been criticized for not reflecting the structure of optimal-control models that incorporate 41 
risk and uncertainty
15
, and for its reliance on a single conception of intergenerational 42 
welfare
21-24
. DICE has also been subject to general criticism regarding the use of cost-benefit 43 
analysis for climate policy purposes25-27.  44 
The Committee for the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was well 45 
aware that the precise conclusions that Nordhaus draws from DICE are highly sensitive to 46 
specific assumptions. In its scientific background paper, the Committee stated that the 2018 47 
Laureate was rewarded for the methodological contribution of integrated assessment 48 
modelling, not the specific policy recommendations following from DICE’s baseline 49 
calibration. In this Analysis, we show that updates to the existing parameters of the DICE 50 
model, drawn from some of the latest contributions in social and climate science, lead to 51 
economically optimal climate policies and emissions pathways that are in line with the UN 52 
climate targets. 53 





 includes in a sensitivity analysis, together 55 
with some of the latest climate science29,30, and a broad range of expert recommendations 56 
on social discount rates
24
. This is complemented by revised assumptions regarding non-CO2 57 
greenhouse gas emissions
31
, the feasibility of negative emission technologies
2,32
, and 58 
 3
constraints on the feasible speed of decarbonization
2,33
. While some of these individual 59 
updates have already been analyzed in the existing literature, our innovation is to analyze 60 
their joint effect in DICE. This reveals that there is no inherent discrepancy between the 61 
method underpinning the 2018 Economics Nobel Prize and the UN climate targets. 62 
 63 
Updates to the Climate Module  64 
Our first major update of the DICE model serves to better reflect the relationship between 65 
emissions, concentration and temperature change. The climate module in the most recently 66 
available version of DICE-2016R2
34
 has two key limitations. First, DICE uses a linearized 67 
carbon cycle model. This linearization has been undertaken for cumulative CO2 emission 68 
levels far higher than those compatible with the UN climate targets5. Consequently, the 69 
impact on CO2 concentrations of each emissions pulse is overestimated for any scenario in 70 
which cumulative emissions are smaller than those found Nordhaus’ optimal analyses34,35. 71 
Second, the energy balance model that is used to calculate the temperature impacts of 72 
radiative forcing in DICE is not in line with the most recent advanced climate system models.  73 
We first update DICE by implementing the carbon cycle module from the simple climate 74 
model FAIR
29,30
. This module takes into account how the removal rate of atmospheric CO2 75 
depends on past cumulative CO2 emissions and changes in the global mean surface 76 
temperature. The FAIR model was central for the assessment of emission pathways in the 77 
IPCC Special Report
36
 on 1.5°C warming
2
.  78 
To further improve the energy balance model in DICE, we recalibrate it so that its response 79 
approximates the results of advanced climate system models included in the Coupled Model 80 
Inter-comparison Project 5 (CMIP5)37. The findings of CMIP5 were central for the climate 81 
system model characterizations in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report
38
. Geoffroy et al.
37
 fit 82 
simple two-box energy balance models to larger climate system models and show that these 83 
simple models capture the global aggregated temperature dynamics of the large-scale 84 
climate system models. We use the findings of Geoffroy et al.
37
 to recalibrate the two-box 85 
energy balance model in DICE and thus make its temperature dynamics consistent with 86 
recent climate science.  87 
The climate sensitivity that determines the equilibrium temperature change for a given 88 
change in radiative forcing in DICE is set to 3.1°C for a doubling of the atmospheric CO2 89 
level
5
. As this remains consistent with the most recent central estimates of equilibrium 90 
climate sensitivity39,40, we leave it unchanged. 91 
These updates roughly align our temperature pathways for a given emission scenario with 92 
median estimates generated by simple climate models (FAIR and MAGICC) used in the IPCC 93 
Special Report on 1.5°C warming2,41 and in the UN Emissions Gap Report3. See Methods and 94 
Extended Data Fig. 1, 2, 5 and 6 for how the carbon cycle and EBM updates, respectively, 95 
affect the optimal pathways. With these changes, lower temperature scenarios become 96 
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attainable, and the optimal temperature change by 2100 drops by half a degree compared 97 
to the original DICE calibration, to just below 3°C by the end of this century. 98 
 99 
Updates to the Economics  100 
The optimal policy response in DICE is notoriously sensitive to two socio-economic inputs: 101 
the social discount rate and the magnitude of economic damages incurred as temperatures 102 
increase. The damage function has proven difficult to estimate because of the joint 103 
uncertainties of physical climatic effects, the likely socio-economic responses to these 104 
effects, and the economic valuation of these damages. Since the first attempts to estimate 105 
economic damages for different temperature levels
4,9,42-44
, methodologies have improved, 106 
but key challenges remain45. For instance, the quadratic damage function used in the 107 
standard DICE is calibrated to a meta-analysis
46
 that has been shown to suffer from multiple 108 
citation bias, a form of non-independence
28
. We instead use the damage function of 109 
Howard and Sterner28, who provide an up-to-date meta-analysis of the quadratic 110 
temperature-damage relationship that corrects for the problem of non-independence. In 111 
what they refer to as their “preferred model”, damages are substantially higher than in the 112 
original DICE model, reaching 6.7% of global GDP for a 3°C temperature increase, as 113 
compared to 2.1% in the standard DICE
34
. This updated damage function is closer to, yet still 114 
more conservative than, recent micro-econometric studies47 and expert elicitations on the 115 
topic
48,49
, which estimate damages upwards of around 10% of global GDP for a 3°C 116 
temperature increase. In our central model, we do not change the functional form of the 117 
damage function, as in Weitzman12,50 or Glanemann et al.51, who apply the damage function 118 
of Burke et al.
47
, but rather update how damage estimates are combined to calibrate the 119 
standard DICE damage function. When using our updated damage function alongside the 120 
improved calibration of the carbon cycle and energy balance model, leaving DICE otherwise 121 
unchanged, optimal temperature is reduced by a further 0.8 degrees to 2.2°C by 2100. For 122 
robustness, we also undertake a simulation of the Weitzman50 damage function, which has 123 
higher order polynomial terms. The details of how this recalibration affects the model 124 
results can be found in the Methods and Fig. S3 in the additional Supplementary 125 
Information. 126 
Next, we consider the determinants of intergenerational welfare as embodied in the social 127 
discount rate (SDR). The SDR captures the ethical choices involved when policies transfer 128 
well-being between current and future generations
11,52,53
. The SDR can be simultaneously 129 
viewed as embodying conditions on fairness and economic efficiency across generations. 130 
Again, we do not change the structure of the DICE model, and our updates calibrate 131 
parameters of the standard Discounted Utilitarian social welfare function used in DICE: the 132 
pure rate of time preference and the elasticity of marginal utility (See Box 1). Other studies 133 
have changed the structure of the social welfare function by separating out the coefficient 134 
of risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, for instance. Indeed, there 135 
are many different ways in which social welfare could be measured24. Box 1 presents further 136 
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details on DICE’s Discounted Utilitarian social welfare function, including extensions that 137 
incorporate risk and uncertainty15,54-56.  138 
Climate policy recommendations are very sensitive to the choice of discount rate. Subjective 139 
ethical perspectives underpin often irreducible differences of opinion on the matter, making 140 
the choice of SDR the subject of disagreement. To inform policy it is therefore important to 141 
understand the extent of disagreement. For this reason, we update the DICE model by using 142 
the latest evidence on expert recommendations on the SDR. Drupp et al.24 surveyed 173 143 
experts on what Nordhaus
57
 referred to as the two “central normative parameters” that 144 
determine the SDR: the pure rate of time preference and elasticity of marginal utility. The 145 
survey responses contain both positive and normative viewpoints on these parameters. By 146 
using these data, we move away from the simple black and white characterization of social 147 
discounting that is usually framed in terms of the Stern versus Nordhaus debate, and engage 148 
with the full range of expert recommendations. 149 
We employ two approaches to summarizing the range of expert recommendations for 150 
policy purposes. First, we consider the climate paths associated with each expert’s chosen 151 
pair of discounting parameters and take the median (“median expert path”) of all 173 model 152 
runs for the SCC, temperature and emissions at each point in time. Second, we consider the 153 
median response for each of the two discounting parameters separately (“median expert 154 
view”). Both approaches have a theoretical justification in the literature on voting outcomes 155 
(see Methods), and hence imagine a voting solution to the disagreement on the SDR58-60 .  156 
Both approaches place greater weight on future generations’ well-being compared to 157 
Nordhaus’ calibration, leading to more stringent climate policies. Compared to the original 158 
DICE using Nordhaus’ discounting parameters, the optimal temperature is reduced by 0.5°C 159 
and 1.1°C according to the “median expert path” and the “median expert view” 160 
respectively.  When combined with the previous updates to the climate science and the 161 
damage function, the optimal temperature increase above the pre-industrial level falls from 162 
2.2°C by 2100 in the case of Nordhaus’ discounting parameter choices, to 2.0°C under the 163 
“median expert path”. The temperature change under the “median expert view” is even 164 









Box 1: Details on social/intergenerational discounting
Economic “optimality” in DICE relates to an optimal consumption and emissions path that results 
from maximizing an inter-temporal Discounted Utilitarian welfare function subject to economic 
and climate constraints. Specifically, intergenerational welfare in DICE is the discounted sum of 
utilities at each point in time where utility is discounted at the pure rate of time preference δ, 
and marginal utility diminishes by η% with each 1% increase in consumption. That is, η is the 
(absolute) elasticity of marginal utility. Depending on the parameterization of intergenerational 
welfare and on the constraints, many different paths of consumption and associated climate 
policies may be considered “optimal”. The social discount rate for consumption in this 
framework depends on both parameters and is given by the simple Ramsey rule:  
  Social discount rate = δ + η * g,              (1) 
 
where g the growth rate of consumption. According to the rule, δ and η * g reflect two distinct 
reasons for discounting future consumption. 
The pure time preference, δ, specifies how impatient society is (a positive approach) or should be 
(a normative approach) when waiting for future well-being. A pure time preference of 1.5% per 
year (or 0.5%) implies that the well-being of someone 100 years from now would be valued 77% 
(39%) less than the well-being of someone living today. These values correspond to the value 
judgement of Nordhaus and the median expert from Drupp et al.24, respectively. Many believe 
that all generations should be weighted equally (δ = 0%). Others have argued for positive values 
to account for the small risk of humankind’s extinction (e.g. δ = 0.1%)11, because non-
discrimination may demand unacceptably high saving from the current generation61, or because 
impatience is reflected in real rates of return on capital markets52. 
η can also be interpreted as measuring inter-temporal inequality aversion. Due to diminishing 
marginal utility, the idea is that an additional 1$ is worth more to a poor person than a rich one. 
In a growing economy, citizens in the future will be richer and their lower marginal utility 
motivates discounting. Suppose the economy grows at 2%. People living in 100 years will be 
seven times richer. If inequality aversion is the only reason for discounting, if η = 1 (1.45), which 
corresponds to the values of the median expert (Nordhaus), the value of $1 in 100 years is only 
14 (6) cents. To estimate this parameter experts use introspection, experiments, surveys, 
revealed evidence from tax schedules and savings decisions62. More generally, η can also reflect 
risk aversion and the desire to smooth consumption over time. 
The simple Ramsey rule (1) is used for project appraisal by a number of countries and 
organizations, including the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC38. However, the rule has various 
extensions that experts recommend24. A notable class of extensions relate explicit incorporations 
of risk and uncertainty15,56,63,64. Inspired by the finance literature, some of these approaches 
combine insights from asset pricing with climate economics and allow for differences in how 
much society is willing to substitute consumption risk across states of nature (risk aversion) 
compared to over time (inequality aversion). While noting these important extensions, we 




Further updates  174 
We next make two further changes to align DICE with the larger scale models used to 175 
develop emission pathways that are assessed in terms of their likelihood to meet the 1.5°C 176 
and 2°C limits in the recent IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C
2
.  177 
First, the original DICE model assumes an exogenous radiative forcing for non-CO2. This 178 
pathway for the non-CO2 emissions is high compared to those generated by technology-rich 179 
IAMs reaching temperature targets in line with those in the Paris agreement65. We adjust 180 
DICE by taking the pathway for non-CO2 forcers estimated by the REMIND integrated 181 
assessment model using the central Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP2) that meets a 182 




. This higher abatement of non-CO2 greenhouse 183 
gases makes even lower temperatures attainable. Among these paths we show that 184 
Nordhaus’ view on discounting yields (using the updated DICE model) an optimal 185 
temperature increase of 2.0°C by 2100, and that reaching the 1.5°C climate target in 2100 186 
(with some temporary overshoot) would be optimal according to the median expert’s view. 187 
In contrast, the median expert path would imply global warming of 1.8°C by 2100. 188 
Second, we consider the role of negative emission technologies (NET). Nordhaus
34
 only 189 
allows for net-negative CO2 emissions after 2160, while Nordhaus
1 allows for the possibility 190 
of NETs within this century. Removing CO2 from the atmosphere by Carbon Dioxide Removal 191 
technologies such as Biomass Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), 192 
afforestation, and Direct Air Capture have been suggested as a possible critical and cost-193 
effective abatement option to limit climate change
2,35,66-68
 . The timing of the availability of 194 
negative emissions technologies and their potential magnitude are under debate69,70, as well 195 
as their relation to the use of different discount rates
71
 . Although we are aware of 196 
biophysical and socio-economic limits to all individual NETs, here we assume NET potentials 197 
by 2050 in line with the recent literature36,69. Feasibility will largely depend on reliable 198 
institutions, good governance and structured incentives across the innovation cycle as well 199 
as the implementation of a NET portfolio that overcomes the risk of relying on a single NET 200 
like BECCS
32,69
. The majority of emission pathways that stay below 2°C warming in the 201 
Working Group 3 of IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report
32,33
 and the recent IPCC Special Report
2
 202 
have net negative CO2 emissions during the second half of this century.  We allow 203 
abatement of CO2 to be at most 120% of the baseline emissions, as assumed by Nordhaus
34
, 204 
but allow for the possibility of net negative CO2 emissions from mid-century onwards 205 
instead of from next mid-century. This update results in optimal negative emissions of 18 206 
GtCO2 per year in 2100 at the lower 95% bound of expert recommendations on the social 207 
discount rate. The emission pathways that are assessed in the IPCC Special Report and that 208 
meet the 1.5°C level by 2100 have a median emission level of -12 GtCO2 in 2100, with a 209 
lower 90% bound of -20 GtCO2 per year as estimated from data available in the Integrated 210 
Assessment Modelling Consortium (IAMC) 1.5°C scenario explorer
72
. Allowing for NETs from 211 
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2050 lowers optimal temperatures but when introduced on top of our previously described 212 
changes to DICE, the effect on our two central runs is small: less than 0.1°C for both the 213 
median expert view and path. 214 
Finally, DICE does not include constraints on the speed of emission reductions. Under 215 
Nordhaus’
34
 calibration this is not a concern since emission reductions occur relatively 216 
gradually. However, in our updated version of DICE, the optimal policy path displays very 217 
fast rates of emission reductions. Yet, there are practical limitations on how rapidly a 218 
transition to a decarbonized world economy can be implemented
73
. Typically, these 219 
restrictions are incorporated into an integrated assessment model either by imposing a cost 220 
on the adjustment pace
74
, or by technology inertia constraints
75
. We impose a set of 221 
constraints on the maximum rate of decarbonization. First, we set the starting emissions to 222 
2020 levels. We also constrain the increase in emissions reductions between 2020 and 2045 223 
to no more than 2 GtCO2 per year. This constraint is consistent with the upper range of 224 
emission reductions used for assessing the 1.5°C and 2°C limits in Clarke et al.33 and Rogelj 225 
et al.
2
. Finally, to avoid unrealistic emission reduction jumps for the period when negative 226 
emissions are feasible (2050 onwards), we limit the growth rate of the emissions reduction 227 
to 10% of the previous (5 year) period’s emissions reduction. Fig. 1 summarizes the 228 
sequential updates within a schematic structure of the DICE integrated assessment model. 229 
 230 
  231 
Figure 1. Updates to the climate-economy DICE model. A stylized schematic of the DICE integrated 232 
assessment model that highlights the seven updates we make to the standard DICE version 233 
(2016R234). These are: (1) A carbon cycle based on the FAIR model29,30, (2) an update of the energy 234 
balance model37, (3) a revised economic damage estimate28, (4) a range of expert views on 235 
intergenerational welfare24, (5) non-CO2 forcing in line with lower emission pathways31, (6) the 236 




A central ground for climate policy  240 
Fig. 2 summarizes the optimal climate policy paths taking all the above-described changes to 241 
DICE into account. Since individual disagreements on value judgments embodied in the 242 
discounting parameters may be largely irreducible
76,77
, we run the DICE model for each 243 
expert’s view on the two discounting parameters to obtain 95th and 66th percentile ranges of 244 
optimal climate policy outcomes. Versions of Fig. 2 for each sequential stage of our 245 
adjustment to DICE are given in the Methods and Extended Data Fig. 5-9.  246 
When expert views of the rate of pure time preference and inequality aversion24 (Fig. 2A) 247 
are translated into global social cost of CO2 emissions (SCC) in US$ per ton of CO2 (Fig. 2B), 248 
the highest SCC for 2020 in the 95 percentile range is $520. By contrast, the lowest SCC in 249 
the 95-percentile range is $17. Nordhaus’ discounting parameters imply a SCC of $82 in 250 
2020 in our updated DICE, which compares to a SCC of $39 in the original DICE (see Fig. S1B 251 
in the additional Supplementary Information). By contrast, the median expert view 252 
translates into a SCC of $208. The median path in turn results in a SCC of $101. In sum, the 253 
social cost of carbon is at least twice as high as in the original DICE calibration.   254 
There is a substantial range of resulting pathways of global fossil fuels related CO2 emissions 255 
per year (Fig. 2C). In the central 66% range, the economy is decarbonized between 2055 and 256 
2100. Given Nordhaus’ choice of discounting parameters, the economy would be 257 
decarbonized within this century, by 2090, while optimal decarbonization takes place by 258 
2065 with the median expert’s view. The median path in turn results in decarbonization by 259 




Figure 2. Climate policy pathways in the updated climate-economy model DICE.  A shows each 263 
expert’s value judgments on discounting parameters (rate of pure time preference; inequality 264 
aversion; n = 173). The triangle (1.5%; 1.45) indicates the choice of discount parameters by Nordhaus 265 
(2018a) and the blue square (0.5%; 1) the median expert’s view on intergenerational welfare. B-D 266 
depict the 95 (grey-shaded area) and 66 (blue-shaded area) percentile ranges in terms of 267 
intergenerational fairness for three climate policy measures: the social cost of CO2 (in US$ per ton), 268 
industrial emissions (in gigatons of CO2) and global mean temperature increases from 1850-1900 269 
levels (in degrees Celsius). These ranges do not correspond to confidence intervals relating to 270 
uncertainty about forecasts, rather they capture how the disagreement about discounting 271 
parameters affects the optimal paths when incorporated into our updated DICE model. B-D also 272 
compare climate policy pathways implied by Nordhaus’ discounting in this updated DICE (black line) 273 
to those resulting from the median expert’s view (blue line) and the median path (green line). While 274 
Nordhaus’ discounting implies an optimal carbon price of $82 in 2020 in our updated DICE, the 275 
median expert path (view) translates into a value of $101 ($208) in 2020. 276 
 277 
It is important to recognize that with Nordhaus’ discounting parameters we find a 278 
temperature increase of only 2.0°C in this updated DICE model instead of 3.5°C in the 279 
original DICE (Fig. 2D). The median expert view (median path) leads to an increase in 280 
temperature of 1.4°C (1.8°C) by 2100, with a 66 percentile range of 1.2-2.2°C. Overall, given 281 
the assumptions on the technological environment and climate constraints in the updated 282 
DICE, 32% of all model runs resulting from the expert views on discounting parameters 283 
would lead to an optimal policy that stays below 1.5°C in 2100, while 76% of all model runs 284 
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stay below 2°C in 2100. These findings suggest that there is support for the Paris climate 285 
targets being “optimal” from a social welfare perspective. 286 
Fig. 3 summarizes the consequences of each sequential model update reported in Fig. 2 on 287 
the optimal climate policy paths. Views on discounting parameters translate into optimal 288 
temperature change by 2100 (Fig. 3A), the timespan to full decarbonization (Fig. 3B), and 289 
the SCC in 2020 (Fig. 3C) for each considered sequential model update to DICE.  290 
 291 
Figure 3. Effects of each sequential model update on optimal climate policy paths. The 66 292 
percentile range of expert’s recommendations on the pure rate of time preference and inequality 293 
aversion translates into the optimal temperature change by 2100 from 1850-1900 levels (A), the 294 
years to decarbonization (B) and the social cost of carbon in 2020 (C) for each sequential update to 295 
DICE considered in this paper. Starting from the DICE 2016R2 baseline (B) we cumulatively add 296 
changes to the DICE model. First, we change the carbon cycle (CC), then add the energy balance 297 
model (EBM), third the temperature-damage relationship (D), fourth the exogenous path for non-CO2 298 
forcing (nCO2), fifth the availability of negative emissions technologies (NET) and finally we add the 299 
technologically feasible speed of decarbonisation (feas). For better visibility of the changes, we only 300 
depict the 66 percentile ranges based on the different expert views on discounting parameters in the 301 
boxplots (Extended Data Fig. 10 shows a box-and-whiskers plot with the 95 percentile ranges). The 302 
triangle indicates the optimal path that is consistent with the Nordhaus34 choice of discount 303 
parameters, the blue square reflects the median expert’s view on intergenerational welfare, and the 304 
green bar the median expert path. 305 
 306 
Updating the carbon cycle model has mixed impacts on the temperature in 2100 depending 307 
on the combination of discounting parameters: it increases optimal warming for the median 308 
expert view and decreases it for Nordhaus’ parameter choices. For most discounting 309 
parameter choices, the carbon cycle update reduces the SCC in 2020 and delays the date of 310 
decarbonization. Recalibrating the energy balance model reduces the optimal temperature 311 
increase by 2100 and prolongs the time until optimal decarbonization for all discounting 312 
parameter combinations. This reduces the cost of emitting an additional ton of CO2 into the 313 
atmosphere for the current generation.  314 
Updating economic damages increases the SCC in 2020, makes it optimal to decarbonize 315 
earlier, and results in a lower temperature change by 2100. Introducing a lower non-CO2 316 
forcing pathway leads to a further drop in optimal temperatures, increases the time to 317 
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decarbonization and reduces the SCC in 2020. Allowing for the availability of net negative 318 
emissions from 2050 leads to postponing emission reductions. This is consistent with the 319 
literature on larger scale integrated assessment models
69
.  320 
In our model runs, negative emissions technologies shift the welfare costs of 321 
decarbonization to future generations while the associated temperature drop by 2100 is 322 
only minor. Adding the feasibility constraints leads to slight increases in the temperature in 323 
2100 and the time until decarbonization, but it only has a small impact on the SCC. 324 
Each of the individual updates that we make to DICE has different impacts on the optimal 325 
path. The largest impact on the optimal temperature in 2100 and the SCC in the year 2020 326 
arises from the updates to the discounting parameters. The sensitivity to discounting 327 
assumptions exists irrespective of when they are introduced in the sequence of model 328 
updates, as is reflected in Fig. 3. The substantial vertical differences between the median 329 
experts’ view and the Nordhaus choice at each cumulative update show how crucial it is to 330 
consider a more representative range of recommendations on intergenerational welfare to 331 
inform policy. In combination with discounting assumptions, updating damages also has a 332 
large effect on the SCC
78
. Specifically, updating the damage function more than doubles the 333 
SCC in 2020 to US$ 289 compared to the previous step of updating the energy balance 334 
model. This impact would be even more pronounced had we used the damage functions 335 
with higher damage exponents or overall higher damages47,50,51,78 (see Methods and Fig. S3 336 
in the additional Supplementary Information).  337 
Finally, the carbon cycle and energy balance model, updated assumptions for non-CO2 338 
forcing, and negative emissions technologies each have two important effects on the 339 
optimal path. First, they contribute to a reduction in the optimal temperature. Second, they 340 
relax the pressure on current generations to rapidly decarbonize, thus postponing the date 341 
at which decarbonization occurs. This latter effect helps the economy to remain within a 342 
given temperature limit at lower welfare costs by allowing a smoother transition to 343 
decarbonization over time. These observations reflect well the way in which inter-temporal 344 
welfare trade-offs play out in economic appraisals of climate change. These two effects are 345 
also reflected in a SCC that falls with the carbon cycle and energy balance updates, and 346 
negative emissions technology, and rises with damage and social discounting updates.  347 
Although we have made a number of modifications to DICE in this paper we have made a 348 
point of keeping the number of changes to a minimum. Indeed, there are many factors 349 
ignored in the analysis that should be part of a more comprehensive appraisal of climate 350 
policies. In addition to uncertainty, these include, tipping points, relative scarcity of non-351 
market goods, climate-induced migration and consideration of a host of alternative ethical 352 
frameworks. In Box 2, we summarize a number of key limitations and potential extensions 353 
proposed in the literature. Likewise, an analysis of the political process of setting the UN 354 
climate targets themselves is outside the scope of this article.  355 
 356 
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Box 2: Limitations and extensions of DICE 357 
Inequality and heterogeneity: A crucial assumption of DICE is the use of a representative agent that 358 
maximizes global well-being. Thus our analysis ignores crucial aspects of heterogeneity relating, 359 
among others, to regional and sub-regional differences in preferences, income levels, adaptive 360 
capacity and damages. Nordhaus early on developed a regionalized version of DICE, called RICE79, 361 
which has subsequently been employed80 and extended to a sub-regional level81 to study the effect 362 
of inequality on climate policy measures. Furthermore, there are analytic models that deal with key 363 
heterogeneities82.  364 
Uncertainty: While DICE is a deterministic model, the long-term future is inherently uncertain. This 365 
relates to processes governing economic development83 and discount rates63,84 , as well as to climate 366 
dynamics and climate damages12,14,15, including the location and extent of tipping points in coupled 367 
climate-society systems85,86. Thus, a more comprehensive economics assessment of climate change 368 
should consider various forms of uncertainty, ranging from standard risk to fundamental 369 
ignorance87. Besides applications of Monte-Carlo analyses in DICE6,34, stochastic computational or 370 
dynamic programming applications55,88,89, and analytic models49,54,90 have already been employed. 371 
Climate damages: DICE assumes a quadratic damage function of temperature increase on economic 372 
output, but a host of other functional forms of the damage function may be plausible. This includes 373 
variants with higher damage exponents, in line with the idea of potentially catastrophic climate 374 
damages12.91, or empirically estimated damage functions47 and expert survey evidence49 that points 375 
towards higher overall damages. However, damages from climate change not only hit output but 376 
also affect the capital stock and thus growth directly92-94. Finally, a considerable share of damages 377 
will affect goods and services that are not traded on markets, such as environmental amenities, 378 
biodiversity and coral reefs45 . These damages to non-market goods—and their associated relative 379 
price changes—should be explicitly modeled and can substantially impact optimal climate policy16,17 .  380 
Endogenous growth: DICE assumes an exogenous decline in technological progress, yet much of 381 
modern growth theory is concerned with endogenous channels of growth95-99. Furthermore, 382 
endogenous population change will likely not only impact resource demand but also affect 383 
innovation100,101.  384 
Abatement cost function: The abatement function in DICE is calibrated to smooth reduction rates. 385 
However, with faster rates of reduction, several non-equilibrium phenomena could make the 386 
reductions more costly, e.g., through increasing levels of unemployment in certain regions. In 387 
addition, if the global efforts to reduce emissions are poorly coordinated, as is the case now, with 388 
certain regions paying much higher attention to the problem, then costs might also be higher than 389 
what would be the case under perfect coordination74,102. On the other hand, scale effects and 390 
technical progress can considerably reduce abatement costs as witnessed in renewables such as 391 
solar and wind in recent years. Relatedly, the marginal abatement costs curve assumed in DICE could 392 
also be made endogenous, such as to feature learning-by-doing dynamics103. 393 
Alternative ethical frameworks: DICE builds on the standard consequentialist Discounted Utilitarian 394 
welfare function that still forms the workhorse model of the economic analysis of climate policy. 395 
However, the literature has proposed and applied numerous alternative ethical approaches22,104 . 396 
Alternative welfare criteria include, among others, Sustainable Discounted Utilitarianism105,106, Rank-397 




We used recent findings from the literature to update several key parameters of the 401 
prominent DICE model developed by Nobel Laureate William Nordhaus. Our updated DICE 402 
model is in line with the higher Paris temperature target, with an optimal temperature 403 
increase of 2.0°C by 2100, even with Nordhaus’ assumptions on discounting
1,34
, and 404 
otherwise well below 2°C towards 1.5°C. Of course, the basic DICE model is deterministic. 405 
Under uncertainty, to ensure the maximum temperature increase is less than 2°C in 2100, or 406 
indeed to hit the lower 1.5°C UN Target, with any degree of certainty (e.g. in 95% of cases) 407 
would require more stringent mitigation policies than the central, deterministic case 408 
presented here.   409 
Even if the UN Paris Agreement is attainable, intergenerationally fair and economically 410 
optimal in our updated version of DICE, it is also necessary to consider the political 411 
feasibility of meeting these stringent climate targets. One way to assess this is to investigate 412 
the level of the optimal price of CO2 and the speed of decarbonization. The mitigation 413 
policies that can be pursued in practice are likely to be constrained in these dimensions, as 414 
recently witnessed in response to the imposition of carbon taxes in Canada and France in 415 
2018-19. While the median expert path implies a carbon price of around US$ 100 in 2020 416 
and zero emissions in 2080, the median expert’s view results in an optimal CO2 price of just 417 
above US$ 200 per ton in 2020 and complete global decarbonization by 2065. This contrasts 418 
with a carbon price of around US$80 that results from the discounting parameters of 419 
Nordhaus1,34 in our updated model and a carbon price of around US$ 40 in Nordhaus’ 420 
original DICE calibration. Thus, carbon prices resulting from the majority of expert views in 421 
our updated DICE model are considerably higher than what is being implemented in most 422 
sectors even in the most ambitious regions of the world. However, it is within the range of 423 
what is currently used in governmental guidance for Cost Benefit Analysis, such as in 424 
Germany where a SCC of around $200
108
 is used, or implemented as actual or effective 425 
carbon taxes in certain sectors in many European countries such as the Netherlands, 426 
Sweden and Switzerland
109
. It should also be recognized that total current taxes on gasoline 427 
in Europe can amount to effective taxes that far exceed our two median cases, with more 428 
than $400 per ton of CO2 in Germany, for instance
110
. Although they are not labelled carbon 429 
taxes, these policies provide some perspective on what could be possible. 430 
Yet these countries are the exception and make up a small part of the global economy. 431 
Furthermore, while carbon pricing is key to achieving the range of optimal climate targets 432 
we present, there are major obstacles to such policy. First, there is lobbying by powerful and 433 
concentrated industries. Second, there is fear of reduced competitiveness. Naturally, this is 434 
mitigated if the policies are global but the fear nevertheless highlights a difficult issue of 435 
policy coordination between nations. A third obstacle is the perception that carbon taxes 436 
hurt the poor disproportionally
111
. It is often argued that distributional concerns are a chief 437 
source of resistance from significant shares of the electorate. Yet, the regressive nature of 438 
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carbon taxes is often exaggerated and in fact, fuel taxes are often progressive in low-income 439 
countries where only the very richest have vehicles and air conditioning112. Yet distributional 440 
concerns may still be real in many contexts and considerable thought will have to go into 441 
the design and implementation of carbon pricing in order to mitigate these widely held 442 
political economy concerns113,114. Perhaps one of the chief obstacles to policy stems from a 443 
straightforward resistance to higher prices. In aviation, for instance, long-haul flights may 444 
double in price if a carbon tax of $300 per ton of CO2 were levied. 445 
The UN Paris Agreement is an expression of the international view that rapid action is 446 
necessary to limit the damages caused by climate change. The IPCC Special Report on the 447 
1.5°C target36 then illustrated the measures required to meet the agreed limit of 1.5oC. In 448 
this Analysis, we have shown that the benefits of limiting global warming to (well) below 2°C 449 
outweigh the costs of doing so when considering updates to the most standard and 450 
influential economic cost-benefit framework for climate change appraisal: Nordhaus’ DICE 451 
model. Our results suggest that there is no inherent disparity between the UN climate 452 
targets and the principle of economic optimality. Nevertheless, enacting ambitious policies 453 
remains a key challenge. 454 
  455 
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Methods 789 
The DICE 2016R2 model is presented in detail in Nordhaus
34
. We implement DICE with the 790 
AMPL optimization software and use the Knitro solver (version 10.2) to obtain the numerical 791 
dynamic optimization results presented in this paper. Note that since we use a different 792 
numerical optimization solver and modeling language than Nordhaus
34
, our numerical 793 
results differ slightly. We provide the programming code and data in separate files. To ease 794 
comparability to Nordhaus’
1,34
 figures, we present industrial emissions, the social cost of 795 
carbon and temperature increases only until the year 2100, while the optimization runs 796 
extend until 2500, as in DICE. 797 
Here we provide a more detailed account of the calibration of the updated DICE model. We 798 
do so by first presenting results of the baseline DICE 2016R2 of Nordhaus34. In a second step 799 
we summarize the updates to key climate and economics-related functional forms and 800 
parameters leading to the final model specification presented in the main text. The resulting 801 
climate policy paths that we present in Fig. 2 of the main text are framed in terms of what is 802 
intergenerationally optimal as reflected by value judgments on the rate of pure time 803 
preference and inequality aversion. Thus, we also offer a more detailed perspective on the 804 
diverging views on discounting parameters, one of the key sensitivities in the economic 805 
analysis of climate change. As a third step we analyze how each of the updates subsequently 806 
affect climate policy paths for (i) Nordhaus’ choice of discounting parameters, (ii) the 807 
median expert’s choice of discounting parameters, (iii) the median path, and for the 95 and 808 
66 percentile ranges resulting from different expert views on intergenerational optimality. 809 
Nordhaus’
34
 baseline calibration is the starting point of our analysis. The resulting pathway 810 
for the social cost of CO2, starting at 39 US$ in 2020 and rising to 296 US$ per ton of CO2, 811 
lies within the politically discussed range for carbon prices. Both the optimal date of 812 
decarbonization in the next century and the optimal atmospheric temperature change of 813 
3.5°C by 2100, rising to 4°C in the middle of the next century are far outside climate policy 814 
pathways that are consistent with the UN temperature limits of 2°C and 1.5°C. We provide 815 
detailed results of Nordhaus’
34
 baseline calibration in Fig. S1 of the additional Supporting 816 
Information.  817 
We argue that the following adjustments from more recent climate and economics research 818 
closes the gap between Nordhaus’ calibration of DICE2016R2 and the Paris Agreement.  819 
 820 
Carbon cycle 821 
Nordhaus
34
 writes that the 2016 version of DICE “incorporates new research on the carbon 822 
cycle. Earlier versions of the DICE model were calibrated to fit the short-run carbon cycle 823 
(primarily the first 100 years). Because the new model is in part designed to calculate long-824 
run trends, such as the impacts on the melting of large ice sheets, it was decided to change 825 
the calibration to fit the atmospheric retention of CO2 for periods up to 4,000 years. Based 826 
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on studies of Archer et al.
115
, the 2016 version of the three-box model does a much better job 827 
of simulating the long-run behavior of larger models with full ocean chemistry. This change 828 
has a major impact on the long-run carbon concentrations.” While this is an improvement 829 
over previous DICE versions, it does not take into account non-linearities in the carbon cycle. 830 
This is important since the fraction of a CO2 emissions pulse that stays in the atmosphere at 831 
any point in time in the future depends on the past cumulative emissions of CO2. Roughly 832 
the larger the cumulative emissions, the larger the fraction that remains115-117. Although 833 
Nordhaus does not explicitly describe which model experiment in Archer et al.
115
 he uses for 834 
calibrating the box model in DICE, it appears from numerical comparison of the carbon cycle 835 
impulse response in DICE with those impulse responses presented in Archer et al.115 that the 836 
calibration is based on an impulse size of 5000 GtC. That is roughly a factor five larger the 837 
amount of cumulative CO2 emissions that are compatible with the targets in the Paris 838 
Agreement. Hence, given the non-linearities in the carbon cycle and climate carbon cycle 839 
feedbacks, the standard carbon cycle in DICE 2016R2 underestimates the removal of CO2 840 
from the atmosphere by the biosphere and ocean when assessing emission pathways with 841 
cumulative emissions considerably smaller than 5000 GtC. As a consequence of this, the 842 
concentration and thus also the temperature impact of each ton of CO2 emitted is likely to 843 
be too high in DICE 2016R2 for cumulative emission levels compatible with a stabilization of 844 
global mean surface temperature well below 2°C. 845 
In order to deal with these issues, we change the carbon cycle in DICE 2016R2 so that it 846 
takes into account the non-linearity in the carbon cycle as well as climate carbon cycle 847 
feedbacks. Specifically, the linearized carbon cycle representation in DICE is changed to the 848 
carbon cycle representation in the simple climate model FAIR29,30, which was used to assess 849 
the climate impact of various emissions pathways in the IPCC
36
 Special Report. This enables 850 
us to model a carbon cycle that is consistent with large scale carbon cycle models, such as 851 
those analyzed in Archer et al.
115
, over a broad range of emission pathways, and not only 852 
pathways with emission levels far above those that are consistent with the Paris Agreement. 853 
In the Extended Data Fig. 1, we compare the optimal paths for atmospheric carbon in the 854 
standard DICE2016R2 calibration to the updated carbon dynamics based on Nordhaus’ 855 
standard discounting parameters. 856 
 857 
Energy balance model  858 
The temperature response to changes in radiative forcing in Nordhaus
34
 is not consistent 859 
with the response in state-of-the-art climate system models37. Since the Energy Balance 860 
Model (EBM) in DICE is a two-box model it has two characteristic response time scales 861 
whose calibration are different than those presented in Geoffroy et al.
37
. The rapid response 862 
(yearly time scales related to the response of the well mixed upper ocean layer) is too slow 863 
in DICE2016R2, while the slow response (century time scales related to the response of the 864 
deep ocean) is too fast compared to advanced climate system models. The latter implies 865 
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that for a given radiative forcing step change the equilibrium temperature level is 866 
approached too fast. We have therefore recalibrated the EBM so that its parameterization 867 
represents the average characteristics of climate models used in the Coupled Model 868 
Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5)
37
. The equilibrium response, i.e. the climate 869 
sensitivity in DICE (being 3.1°C for a doubling in the CO2 concentration), is left unchanged 870 
since it fits well in the middle of the likely distribution of Equilibrium Climate 871 
Sensitivity5,39,40.  872 
In the Extended Data Fig. 2, we compare the optimal temperature dynamics in DICE 2016R2 873 
with the dynamics when only the new EBM climate system model (based on Geoffroy et 874 
al.37) is implemented. The optimal temperature drops by around half a degree Celsius due to 875 
the introduction of the EBM only. Additionally, our recalibrated model includes a higher 876 
initial temperature level in 2015 compared to the standard DICE 2016R2. That is for two 877 
reasons. First, in DICE2016R2 the reference period for the atmospheric temperature change 878 
is 1900 while the updated EBM uses the average between1850-1900 and hence, the 879 
temperature has increased slightly more since the 1850-1900 period. Second, we initialize 880 
the updated EBM with historical forcing estimates to ensure that the model’s initial 881 
conditions in 2015 are internally consistent (i.e., the temperature in the two boxes are 882 
consistent with the radiative forcing history). We are not aware of any information on how 883 
this calibration is dealt with in the standard DICE 2016R2. 884 
 885 
Economic damages from climate change 886 
The climate damage function in DICE translates a temperature increase into a percentage 887 
change in global GDP. Due to the large uncertainty involved in estimation, meta-analyses 888 
are a standard tool to inform the choice of the parameter that scales the temperature-889 
damage relationship in models such as DICE
28,43,44,46
.  890 
Tol
43
 provided an influential meta-analysis of climate damages, which served as a basis for 891 
previous versions of the DICE model. Both the 2009 meta-analysis and an update, Tol44, 892 
have been found to contain statistical errors
28
. As a result Nordhaus revised the climate 893 
damage function in the 2016 version of DICE34,46 based on his own meta-analysis of 36 894 
studies that report a damage estimate. Each of these estimates is treated as an independent 895 
draw from an underlying damage function. This is a precondition for using the usual 896 
statistical analysis needed. However, the independence assumption can be questioned as 897 
several of the estimates come from the same limited circle of authors. The selected climate 898 
damage function translates a temperature increase of 3°C into a damage of 2.12% of global 899 
GDP.  900 
Howard and Sterner
28
 provide an up-to-date meta-analysis of the temperature-damage 901 
relationship. They find strong evidence that Nordhaus and Moffat’s46 damage estimate is 902 
biased due to duplicates and omitted variables in the regression. In their preferred model
28
 903 
(Regression 4 in Table 2), total damages that include a markup of 25% for omitted non-904 
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market damages from climate change are substantially higher, reaching 6.69% of global GDP 905 
for a 3°C temperature increase. This is closer to recent empirical evidence47, which shows 906 
that economic damages from climate change may be even more severe, but has the merit 907 
that it can be incorporated directly into the DICE model. Nordhaus
1
 also used this damage 908 
function in sensitivity analysis. Extended Data Fig. 3 compares the baseline to the isolated 909 
effect of the updated optimal economic damage from climate change (as a percentage of 910 
global GDP) under Nordhaus’ discounting choices. Damages are substantially higher in the 911 
updated model for most of the time horizons considered. 912 
 913 
Intergenerational welfare 914 
In the standard social objective function used in DICE, welfare weights across generations 915 
can be chosen based on both normative and positive considerations. Drupp et al.24 have 916 
undertaken a large, representative survey of academics publishing in leading economics 917 
journals who have specific expertise on these matters to determine their views on the 918 
values that the welfare weights in the social objective function should take. 173 919 
respondents provided complete responses on the normative parameters in DICE (See Box 920 
1). In the main text, we employ two approaches to find some central, mediating value 921 
among the different expert opinions, for policy purposes. We now report the motivation 922 
behind these concepts of central tendency by explaining how the “median expert view” and 923 
“median expert path” are constructed. 924 
The “median expert view” represents the median response of all 173 experts for each of the 925 
two discounting parameters, the rate of pure time preference and inequality aversion. The 926 
“median expert view” has a theoretical justification in the literature on voting outcomes. It 927 
can be interpreted as the voting outcome if experts have circular indifference curves around 928 




The “median expert path” represents the median of all model runs for the SCC, temperature 931 
and emissions associated with each of the 173 experts’ chosen pair of discounting 932 
parameters at each point in time. The “median expert path” has a theoretical justification in 933 
the literature on voting outcomes. It can be interpreted as the voting outcome if experts 934 
have single-pealed preferences, and vote over a specific end point of a climate path at a 935 
given point in time58, instead of parameters as in the case for the “median expert view”. 936 
Hence, a given “median expert path” tracks voting outcomes for a given climate path at any 937 
given point in time.  938 
The “median expert path” should primarily be viewed as a pragmatic, alternative definition 939 
of central tendency, as the superior mediating statistic it is not clear a priori. The “median 940 
expert path” offers mediating climate paths that are less stringent compared to the paths 941 
implied by the “median expert view”.  942 
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It should be noted that a major finding of the expert survey is that a majority of experts do 943 
not follow the simple Discounted Utilitarian approach and associated Ramsey rule (See Box 944 
1), but deviate for a number of reasons
24
. These include project risk, uncertainty, 945 
environmental scarcity, effects of inequalities within generations as well as alternative 946 
ethical approaches (See Box 2). As the mean (median) imputed simple Ramsey rule in the 947 
expert survey is higher than the recommended mean (median) social discount rate, these 948 
extensions are likely to lead to recommending more stringent climate policy. The main text 949 
may therefore depict conservative results.  950 
 951 
Non-CO2 forcing 952 
Abatement of non-CO2 emissions are critical when aiming for stringent climate stabilization 953 
levels2,36. The scenario assumption for the radiative forcing from non-CO2 climate forcers in 954 
Nordhaus
34
 is exogenously given. It is substantially higher compared to what is estimated in 955 
other climate scenario work analyzing pathways compatible with stabilization of global 956 
mean surface temperature around 1.5-3°C above the pre-industrial level, e.g., the 957 
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) 2.6 and 4.5
119
 or the Shared Socioeconomic 958 
Pathways (SSP) towards 1.9 W/m2 118. While several of these abatement options for non-959 
CO2 emissions might not be cost-effective at modest carbon prices as those suggested in the 960 
original DICE model (39 US$ in 2020), it very likely becomes cost effective to abate non-CO2 961 
greenhouse gases if governments implement policies that will meet current UN climate 962 
targets
2,120
. This implies that the exogenously set radiative forcing pathway for non-CO2 963 
emissions in DICE is too high for the majority of our optimal policy runs. We therefore 964 
consider a pathway of non-CO2 greenhouse gases that is better aligned to the CO2 price and 965 
temperature levels we obtain with the updated version of DICE. Specifically, we have 966 
changed the radiative forcing scenario from non-CO2 forcers so that it matches the path of 967 
the REMIND integrated assessment model using the SSP2 scenario meeting a non-CO2 968 
forcing level of 2.6 W/m2 in 210031. This scenario reaches similar carbon concentrations, 969 
radiative forcing and temperature levels as obtained in our fully updated DICE model. In the 970 
Extended Data Fig. 4, we compare the standard to the updated path for non-CO2 forcing in 971 
isolation.  972 
 973 
Negative emissions technologies 974 
A key difference between the DICE and the IPCC Special Report
36
 is the stance regarding the 975 
availability of carbon removal technologies leading to net negative emissions. While the 976 
scenarios considered by the IPCC
2,36
 make use of negative emission technologies roughly by 977 
the year 2050, the DICE 2016R2 model assumes that this will only be feasible from 2160 978 
onwards. In line with the pathways assessed in the IPCC report, we allow for the possibility 979 
of negative emissions technologies from mid-century onwards. We set the upper level of 980 
abatement to 120% of baseline emissions as in DICE 2016R2. Consequently, emissions reach 981 
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-18 GtCO2 per year for the lower 95% bound of expert views on discounting by 2100.  For 982 
comparison, the emission pathways that are assessed in IPCC SR 1.5 and that meet the 1.5°C 983 
level by 2100 have a median emission level of -12 GtCO2 per year in 2100, with a 90% 984 
interval of -20 GtCO2 per year to -2.3 GtCO2 per year, while the emissions level in 2070 has a 985 
median of -8.0 GtCO2 per year and a 90% interval of -15 GtCO2 per year to -0.70 GtCO2 per 986 
year (estimated from data available in IAMC 1.5°C scenario explorer
72
).  The timing of the 987 
availability of negative emissions technologies as well as their potential magnitude are still 988 
intensely debated
69,70
, and will ultimately, similar to all abatement technologies, depend on 989 
the interplay of technological development and (expected) carbon prices.  990 
 991 
Feasibility constraints 992 
We impose a set of constraints on the maximum rate of technologically feasible 993 
decarbonization. These conditions allow for a more credible study of low-emission 994 
scenarios. The main text contains all relevant information. In a next step, we present the 995 
resulting climate policy paths under updated model specifications. In Fig. S2 of the 996 
additional Supporting Information, we show how different positions on social discounting 997 
translate into plausible ranges of climate policy paths within the baseline DICE 2016R2 998 
model calibration. 999 
 1000 
Optimal climate policy paths under updated model specifications  1001 
First, we now consider the introduction of the new carbon cycle dynamics. Extended Data 1002 
Fig. 5 shows how different positions on social discounting translate into plausible ranges of 1003 
climate policy paths in DICE 2016R with the new updated carbon cycle. 1004 
The maximum SCC in the 66 (95) percentile range are $277 ($1017) in the year 2020 and 1005 
$1080 ($2310) in 2100. By contrast, the minimum SCC in 2020 in the 66 (95) percentile 1006 
range is $16 ($3) increasing to $161 ($24) in 2100. Nordhaus’ SCC is at $25 in 2020 and $245 1007 
in 2100. By contrast, the median expert view translates into a SCC of $140 in 2020, 1008 
increasing to $742 in 2100. The median path in turn results in a SCC of $43 in 2020, 1009 
increasing to $484 in 2100.  1010 
In the central 66 percentile plausible range, the decarbonization of the global economy 1011 
occurs 5 years later compared to the baseline model; the economy should either be 1012 
decarbonized in 2045 or 2135. In Nordhaus’ best-guess, the economy would not be 1013 
decarbonized within this century, while optimal decarbonization takes place by 2065 in the 1014 
median expert’s view. The median path in turn results in decarbonization by 2090.  1015 
While Nordhaus’ view on social discounting translates into 3.27°C warming by 2100, the 1016 
median expert view (median paths) leads to an increase in temperature of 2.43°C (2.93°C) 1017 
by 2100. In the 66-percentile range, the temperature increase in 2100 is as high as 3.43°C 1018 
(3.53°C) at the upper end, and 2.13°C (2.0°C) at the lower end. Moreover, none of the 1019 
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model runs that result from the expert views would lead to an optimal policy that stays 1020 
within the 1.5°C limit of the Paris Agreement. Overall, only 6% of all model runs stay below 1021 
2°C by 2100. 1022 
Second, we add the updated energy balance model. Extended Data Fig. 6 shows how 1023 
different positions on social discounting translate into plausible ranges of climate policy 1024 
paths in DICE 2016R2 with updated carbon cycle and energy balance model.  1025 
Compared to the model that only incorporates the updated carbon cycle the SCC decrease 1026 
in almost all model runs. The maximum SCC in the 66 (95) percentile range are $221 ($752) 1027 
in the year 2020 and $887 ($1720) in 2100. By contrast, the minimum SCC in 2020 in the 95 1028 
(66) percentile range is $6 ($18) increasing to $41 ($161) in 2100. The SCC using the 1029 
discounting parameters of Nordhaus remains at $25 in 2020 and increases to $245 in 2100. 1030 
By contrast, the median expert view results in a SCC of $113 in 2020, increasing to $609 in 1031 
2100. The median path in turn leads to a SCC of $38 in 2020, increasing to $406 in 2100.  1032 
In the central 66 percentile plausible range, the economy should either be decarbonized in 1033 
2055 or 2190. In Nordhaus’ best-guess, the economy would not be decarbonized within this 1034 
century, while optimal decarbonization takes place by 2065 in the median expert’s view. 1035 
The median path in turn results in decarbonization by 2090. Hence, the introduction of the 1036 
updated energy balance model shifts optimal decarbonization into the future.  1037 
While Nordhaus’ view on social discounting now translates into 2.97°C warming by 2100, 1038 
the median expert view (median paths) leads to an increase in temperature of 2.14°C 1039 
(2.61°C) by 2100. In the 95% (66%) range, the temperature increase in 2100 is 3.27°C 1040 
(3.12°C) at the upper end, and 1.63°C (1.83°C) at the lower end. Moreover, still none of the 1041 
model runs that result from the expert views would lead to an optimal policy that stays 1042 
within the 1.5°C limit of the Paris Agreement. Overall, now 23% of all model runs stay below 1043 
2°C by 2100. 1044 
Third, we add the updated temperature-damage relationship according to Howard and 1045 
Sterner28. Extended Data Fig. 7 shows how different positions on social discounting translate 1046 
into plausible ranges of climate policy paths in DICE 2016R2 with updated carbon cycle, 1047 
energy balance model and temperature-damage relationship. 1048 
Compared to the model that incorporates the updated carbon cycle and energy balance 1049 
model only, the SCC is, not surprisingly, increased quite markedly by the introduction of the 1050 
new damage function.  The maximum SCC in the 66 (95) percentile range are $568 ($2363) 1051 
in the year 2020 and $2203 ($5345) in 2100. By contrast, the minimum SCC in 2020 in the 95 1052 
(66) percentile range is $19 ($56) increasing to $129 ($448) in 2100. Nordhaus’ SCC is $76 in 1053 
2020 and increasing to $593 in 2100. By contrast, the median expert view leads to a SCC of 1054 
$289 in 2020, increasing to $1464 in 2100. The median path in turn results in a SCC of $113 1055 
in 2020, increasing to $995 in 2100.  1056 
In the central 66 percentile plausible range, the economy should either be decarbonized in 1057 
2025 or 2090. In Nordhaus’ best-guess, the economy would be decarbonized by 2080, while 1058 
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optimal decarbonization takes place by 2040 in the median expert’s view. The median path 1059 
in turn results in decarbonization by 2065. Hence, the introduction of the updated 1060 
temperature-damage relationship means that optimal decarbonization occurs sooner.  1061 
While Nordhaus’ view on social discounting now translates into 2.24°C warming by 2100, 1062 
the median expert view (median paths) leads to an increase in temperature of 1.71°C 1063 
(2.02°C) by 2100. In the 95 (66) percentile range, the temperature increase in 2100 is 2.97°C 1064 
(2.46°C) at the upper end, and 1.63°C (1.63°C) at the lower end. Moreover, still none of the 1065 
model runs that result from the expert views would lead to an optimal policy that stays 1066 
within the 1.5°C limit of the Paris Agreement. However, with updated damage function, 57% 1067 
of all model runs stay below 2°C by 2100. 1068 
 1069 
Howard and Sterner28 provide an update on how damage estimates are combined to 1070 
calibrate the standard damage function, but abstract from “catastrophic” climate damages. 1071 
In the following, we run the DICE model with updated carbon cycle and energy balance 1072 
model with the Weitzman50 damage function calibrated to incorporate damages of 2.9% 1073 
(50%) in units of output for a temperature increase of 3°C (6°C). Fig. S3 in the additional 1074 
Supporting Information shows how different positions on social discounting translate into 1075 
plausible ranges of climate policy paths in DICE 2016R2 with updated carbon cycle, energy 1076 
balance model and temperature-damage relationship as in Weitzman
50
 . Overall, the results 1077 
show much less stringent climate policy as compared to the case with the Howard and 1078 
Sterner
28
 damage function. This is because, for up to 3°C temperature increase, the 1079 
Weitzman50 damage function has a similar shape as compared to the Nordhaus34 damage 1080 
function. Only for higher temperature increases, the “catastrophic” damages kick in, leading 1081 
to 50% output loss for 6°C warming. Thus, in the relevant range of climate policy measures 1082 
that are optimal according to DICE with updates carbon cycle and energy balance model (for 1083 
example 3.27°C temperature increase by 2100 at the upper 95% bound), the “catastrophic” 1084 
part of Weitzman’s
50
 damage function does not become relevant. 1085 
Fourth, we add the updated exogenous path for non-CO2 forcing. Extended Data Fig. 8 1086 
shows how different positions on social discounting translate into plausible ranges of 1087 
climate policy paths in DICE 2016R2 with updated carbon cycle, energy balance model, 1088 
temperature-damage relationship and non-CO2 forcing.  1089 
The updated non-CO2 forcing scenario reflects an improved management of non-CO2 1090 
emissions in line with the SCC and temperature levels we got after having updated the 1091 
damage function. The maximum SCC values thus decrease; in the 66 (95) percentile range 1092 
they are $358 ($1059) in the year 2020 and $1258 ($2193) in 2100. By contrast, the 1093 
minimum SCC in 2020 in the 95 (66) percentile range is $19 ($54) increasing to $121 ($377) 1094 
in 2100. Nordhaus’ SCC is $72 in 2020 and increasing to $491 in 2100. By contrast, the 1095 
median expert view leads to a SCC of $229 in 2020, increasing to $1006 in 2100. The median 1096 
path in turn results in a SCC of $106 in 2020, increasing to $761 in 2100.  1097 
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In the central 66 percentile plausible range, the economy should either be decarbonized in 1098 
2035 or 2100. In Nordhaus’ best-guess, the economy would be decarbonized in 2085, while 1099 
optimal decarbonization takes place by 2050 in the median expert’s view. The median path 1100 
in turn results in decarbonization by 2070.  1101 
While Nordhaus’ view on social discounting now for the first time translates into staying 1102 
below the 2°C temperature target (1.98°C warming by 2100), the median expert view 1103 
(median paths) leads to an increase in temperature of 1.44°C (1.75°C) by 2100. In the 95 1104 
(66) percentile range, the temperature increase in 2100 is 2.68°C (2.21°C) at the upper end, 1105 
and 1.28°C (1.32°C) at the lower end. For the first time the 1.5°C temperature target by 1106 
2100 is in line with optimal economic policy according to a third of the 173 expert views on 1107 
social discounting. Three quarters of all model runs stay below 2°C by 2100. 1108 
Fifth, we make negative emissions technologies available in 2050 instead of 2160 in 1109 
DICE2016R2. Extended Data Fig. 9 shows how different positions on social discounting 1110 
translate into plausible ranges of climate policy paths in DICE 2016R2 with updated carbon 1111 
cycle, energy balance model, temperature-damage relationship, non-CO2 forcing and 1112 
negative emissions technologies available by 2050. 1113 
The earlier availability of negative emissions technologies increases the emissions budget in 1114 
line with any given temperature target. The maximum SCC values in the 66 (95) percentile 1115 
range are $242 ($425) in the year 2020 and $630 ($640) in 2100. By contrast, the minimum 1116 
SCC in 2020 in the 95 (66) percentile range is $19 ($54) increasing to $113 ($362) in 2100. 1117 
Nordhaus’ SCC is $70 in 2020 and increasing to $446 in 2100. The median expert view leads 1118 
to a SCC of $199 in 2020, increasing to $575 in 2100. The median path in turn results in a 1119 
SCC of $103 in 2020, increasing to $569 in 2100.  1120 
In the central 66 percentile plausible range, the economy should either be decarbonized in 1121 
2060 or 2100. In Nordhaus’ best-guess, the economy would be decarbonized in 2090, while 1122 
optimal decarbonization takes place by 2070 in the median expert’s view. The median path 1123 
in turn results in decarbonization by 2080.  1124 
While Nordhaus’ view on social discounting translates into 2.01°C warming by 2100, the 1125 
median expert view (median paths) leads to an increase in temperature of 1.38°C (1.75°C) 1126 
by 2100. In the 95 (66) percentile range, the temperature increase in 2100 is 2.63°C (2.23°C) 1127 
at the upper end, and 0.90°C (1.20°C) at the lower end. 38% of all model runs stay within 1128 
the 1.5°C limit of the Paris Agreement and 76% of all model runs stay below 2°C by 2100.  1129 
As the last step, we add the described technology inertia constraints resulting in Figure 2 in 1130 
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